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I. INTRODUCTION 
On any given day, almost all people come in contact with at least 
one or two other people, though most of us usually come in contact with 
many more. This contact occurs in employment settings, social settings, 
educational settings, and public settings, such as the street or grocery 
store. This contact that we have with other people can be characterized as 
“interacting with others” and is part of the inherent nature of humans as 
social beings. 
Interacting with others can involve many abilities, including 
speaking, seeing, hearing, listening, understanding, walking, 
communicating, and others. These are all abilities that most people can 
perform to some extent, and that most people take for granted. Although 
some people may be better at these abilities than other people, one’s skill 
or desire (as opposed to capability) in performing any of these abilities 
does not affect the fact that it is being performed or, in the context of 
contact with others, the fact that the person is interacting with others. 
Most of the abilities listed above are considered “major life 
activities” under the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 Nonetheless, there 
is no judicial consensus on whether “interacting with others” itself is a 
major life activity. Three circuits – the First, Ninth, and Second – have 
addressed the issue of whether interacting with others is a major life 
                                                                                                             
 1 See infra Part II.B.2. For further discussion on major life activities see Lisa 
Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the 
“Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 
1405 (1999); Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 
997 (2004); Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 217 (2004); Ann Hubbard, The Myth of Independence and the Major Life Activity of 
Caring, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 327 (2004); Heidi R. Youngs, Reproduction as a 
Major Life Activity Under the ADA: A Survey of the Law Beginning with the Eighth 
Circuit, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 455 (1998); Kiren Dosanjh Zucker, The Meaning of Life: 
Defining “Major Life Activities” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 86 MARQ. L. 
REV. 957 (2003); Timothy D. Johnston, Reproduction Is Not a Major Life Activity: 
Implications for HIV Infection as a Per Se Disability Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 189 (1999); Carolee Kvoriak Lezuch, Note, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Redefining “Major Life Activity” to Protect the 
Mentally Disabled, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1839 (1999); Daniel A. McMillan, Note, Playing 
with Work: Must “Work” Be Treated as a “Major Life Activity” for Purposes of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1333 (2004); Sarah Lynn 
Oquist, Casenote, Reproduction Constitutes a “Major Life Activity” Under the ADA: 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 32 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 1357 (1999); Melissa S. Wandersee, Comment, The Far-Reaching Effects of 
Reproduction as a “Major Life Activity” Under the ADA: What Will This Expansion 
Mean to Employers and Their Insured?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 429 (1999). 
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activity.2 The First Circuit has said that it is not, while the Ninth and 
Second Circuits have said that it is.3 
This article argues that interacting with others is a major life 
activity. Part II discusses the background of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, including its purpose and coverage, as well as how 
“disability” is defined by the Act and judicial interpretation of the Act.4 
Part III presents the circuit split on the issue and describes each of the 
three circuit court decisions that have addressed the issue of whether 
interacting with others is a major life activity.5 Part IV explains why the 
Ninth and Second Circuits are correct in finding that “interacting with 
others” is a “major life activity.”6 They are correct because the activity of 
interacting with others falls within the Supreme Court’s definition of 
“major” and it is similar to other activities that are major life activities.7 
Part IV also discusses what the possible tests are for determining when 
the major life activity of interacting with others is “substantially 
limited,”8 and argues that the Second Circuit’s test is correct because it 
addresses one’s ability to communicate with others, which is a 
fundamental aspect of “interacting with others.”9 Part V concludes this 
article.10 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Americans with Disabilities Act 
1. Rationale and Purpose of the Act 
On July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) into law.11 It was the world’s 
                                                                                                             
 2 See infra Part III. 
 3 See infra Part III. For further discussion on whether “interacting with others” is a 
major life activity, see Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139 (2002); Mark 
DeLoach, Note, Can’t We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with 
Others” as a Major Life Activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1313 (2004); Bryan P. Stephenson, Comment, I’m So Lonesome I Could Cry . . . 
But Could I Sue?: Whether “Interacting with Others” Is a Major Life Activity Under the 
ADA, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2004). 
 4 See infra Part III. 
 5 See infra Part III. 
 6 See infra Part IV. 
 7 See infra Part IV.A. 
 8 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 9 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 10 See infra Part V. 
 11 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 152, 221, 225, 
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first comprehensive piece of legislation designed to give equal rights to 
people with disabilities12 and was the culmination of a decades-long 
campaign by advocates of rights for the disabled.13 The ADA was well 
received and enjoyed enormous public support.14 
Congress passed the ADA in response to “the continuing existence 
of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice” against people 
with disabilities.15 There may have also been some interest to give 
disabled persons protection since the Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that 
disabled persons were not a quasi-suspect class under the Equal 
Protection Clause, meaning legislation directed at them would not 
receive heightened scrutiny.16 At the time of the ADA’s enactment there 
were around forty-three million people living in the United States with 
one or more physical or mental disabilities.17 At the time of the 2000 
census, there were roughly fifty million Americans over the age of five 
who were considered disabled.18 
In the past, people with disabilities tended to be isolated and 
segregated from society.19 Such forms of discrimination continue today 
and are a “serious and pervasive social problem.”20 Discrimination 
against disabled persons is generally the result of societal “stereotypes, 
                                                                                                             
611, 711, and 29 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 2005)). When President Bush signed the ADA he 
made some remarks, including the following: 
This act is powerful in its simplicity. It will ensure that people with 
disabilities are given the basic guarantees for which they have worked so 
long and so hard: independence, freedom of choice, control of their lives, 
the opportunity to blend fully and equally into the rich mosaic of the 
American mainstream. Legally, it will provide our disabled community with 
a powerful expansion of protections and then basic civil rights. It will 
guarantee fair and just access to the fruits of American life which we all 
must be able to enjoy. 
President George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (July 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/90072600.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
 12 President George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/ 
papers/1990/90072600.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
 13 Kevin L. Cope, Comment, Sutton Misconstrued: Why the ADA Should Now Permit 
Employers to Make Their Employees Disabled, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1758 (2004). 
 14 Id. 
 15 ADA § 2(a)(9), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(9). 
 16 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985). 
 17 ADA § 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(1). 
 18 See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Quick Table P21, Disability Status of the 
Civilian Noninstitutional Population (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet 
/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP21&-ds_ 
name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-_lang=en&-_sse=on (note that this table only counted those 
individuals not living in institutions) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
 19 ADA § 2(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(2). 
 20 Id. 
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discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears” that are not 
representative of the abilities of such persons to participate in and 
contribute to society.21 
In passing the Act, Congress pointed out that discrimination against 
people with disabilities occurs in many different areas including 
“employment, housing, public accommodations, education, 
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health 
services, voting, and access to public services.”22 Congress also 
recognized that intentional exclusion is not the only type of 
discrimination suffered by disabled persons, but that the way buildings, 
transportation systems, and communications systems are designed also 
have a discriminatory effect on the disabled.23  Until the ADA was 
enacted, disabled persons were even more disadvantaged from a legal 
standpoint than individuals who suffered discrimination on the basis of 
their “race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age” because, unlike 
these other individuals, disabled persons “often had no legal recourse to” 
remedy such discrimination.24 
Congress specifically stated four purposes of the ADA. First, the 
Act was meant to provide a thorough and understandable directive for 
the elimination of discrimination against disabled persons.25 Second, it 
was meant to provide standards for addressing discrimination based on 
disability that are “clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable.”26 Third, 
it was meant to make sure that the Federal Government “plays a central 
role in enforcing the standards established by [the Act] on behalf of 
individuals with disabilities.”27 Finally, the Act was meant to bring the 
force of congressional authority into play, especially Congress’ power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the interstate commerce power, 
enabling the major areas of discrimination against disabled persons to be 
addressed.28 Congress also stated that the proper goals with regard to 
people with disabilities are “to assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such 
individuals.”29 
                                                                                                             
 21 D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother’s Keeper: Disabilities, Paternalism, and Threats 
to Self, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 67 (2003). See also ADA § 2(a)(7), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§12101(a)(7). 
 22 ADA § 2(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(3). 
 23 Id. § 2(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(5). 
 24 Id. § 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(4). 
 25 Id. § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1). 
 26 Id. § 2(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(2). 
 27 Id. § 2(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(3). 
 28 Id. § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4). 
 29 Id. § 2(a)(8), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8). 
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2. Coverage of the Act 
The ADA is divided into five titles.30 Title I addresses 
discrimination against disabled persons in employment situations.31 Title 
II addresses discrimination in public services, including the acts of public 
entities and the availability of public transportation.32 Title III addresses 
public accommodations and services operated by private entities.33 Title 
IV addresses the discriminatory effect of telecommunications systems on 
the hearing or speech-impaired, including public service 
announcements.34 Title V contains miscellaneous provisions.35 
The ADA applies to private employers with 15 or more 
employees,36 labor organizations, joint labor-management committees, 
employment agencies,37 state and local governments or entities thereof,38 
and private entities that operate public accommodations and services.39 
The ADA does not apply to the federal government,40 except for those 
employed by the U.S. Senate, the House of Representatives, and other 
Congressional entities (e.g. Library of Congress),41 Indian tribes, or bona 
fide private membership clubs.42 
Different entities have the authority to issue regulations 
implementing different parts of the ADA. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has the authority43 to promulgate 
regulations dealing with Title I,44 which contains the employment 
provisions of the ADA. The Attorney General has the authority45 to 
promulgate regulations implementing Title II, Subtitle A,46 which 
contains the provisions relating to public services, and the authority47 to 
                                                                                                             
 30 Id. § 1, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 Note. 
 31 Id. §§ 101-108, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117. 
 32 Id. §§ 201-246, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12165. 
 33 Id. §§ 301-310, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189. 
 34 ADA §§ 401, 402, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 152, 221, 225, 611(West 2005) (amending the 
Communications Act of 1934). 
 35 Id. §§ 501-514, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12202-12213. 
 36 Id. § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A). 
 37 Id. § 101(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(2). 
 38 Id. § 201(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(1). 
 39 Id. § 301(6)-(7), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(6)-(7). 
 40 Id. § 101(5)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B). 
 41 JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 793-94 n.b (5th ed. 2001). 
 42 ADA § 101(5)(B)(i)-(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 43 Id. § 106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12116. 
 44 Id. §§ 101-108, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117. 
 45 Id. § 204, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12134. 
 46 Id. §§ 201-205, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134. 
 47 Id. § 306(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12186(b). 
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promulgate such regulations for Title III,48 excluding the transportation 
provisions.49 The Secretary of Transportation has the authority50 to 
promulgate regulations implementing Title II, Subtitle B,51 which 
contains provisions dealing with public transportation, and the authority52 
to promulgate such regulations for the transportation provisions of Title 
III.53 The Federal Communications Commission has the authority54 to 
promulgate regulations implementing Title IV,55 which contains the 
provisions dealing with telecommunications and public service 
announcements. Also, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers 
Compliance Board is granted authority to “issue minimum guidelines 
that shall supplement the existing Minimum Guidelines and 
Requirements for Accessible Design” with regard to Title II and Title 
III.56 
In addition to the responsibility of promulgating regulations in their 
respective areas, each federal entity is charged with “render[ing] 
technical assistance to individuals and institutions that have rights or 
duties under the respective title or titles for which such agency has 
responsibility.”57 The duty of implementing a plan for such assistance is 
divided up by Title.58 For Title I, the EEOC and the Attorney General are 
charged with implementing the plan for assistance.59 The Attorney 
General must also implement the plan for assistance for Title II, Subtitle 
A.60 For Title II, Subtitle B, the Secretary of Transportation must 
implement the plan of assistance.61 For Title III, the Attorney General 
must coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation and the Chair of the 
Architectural Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to implement 
the plan.62 Finally, the Chairman of the Federal Communications 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. §§ 301-310, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189. 
 49 Id. §§ 302(b)(2)(B)-(C), 304 (other than (b)(4)), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12182(b)(2)(B)-
(C), 12184 (other than (b)(4)). 
 50 Id. §§ 223, 229, 244, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12143(b), 12149, 12164. 
 51 Id. §§ 221-246, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12141-12165. 
 52 Id. § 306(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12186(a)(1). 
 53 Id. §§ 302(b)(2)(B)-(C), 304 (other than (b)(4)), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12182(b)(2)(B)-
(C), 12184 (other that (b)(4)). 
 54 Id. § 401(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 225(d)(1). 
 55 Id. §§ 401, 402, 47 U.S.C.A. § 152, 221, 225, 611. 
 56 Id. § 504, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12204. 
 57 Id. § 506(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(1). 
 58 Id. § 506(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2). 
 59 Id. § 506(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(A). 
 60 Id. § 506(c)(2)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 61 Id. § 506(c)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
 62 Id. § 506(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(C). 
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Commission must coordinate with the Attorney General to implement 
the plan for Title IV.63 
Even with all this delegation of authority, the Supreme Court has 
noted that “[n]o agency . . . has been given authority to issue regulations 
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, which fall 
outside Titles I-V. Most notably, no agency has been delegated authority 
to interpret the term ‘disability.’”64 The Court, however, used the 
EEOC’s regulations on the definition of “disability” in its analysis.65 The 
Court declined to decide what deference was due these regulations.66 
This article focuses on the definition of disability found in the 
preliminary sections of the Act.67 This definition will be examined and 
discussed in the following section.68 
B. Disability Defined 
The ADA states that “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to 
an individual – (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”69 Although much of the focus of this paper will be on what 
is considered to be a major life activity, the other elements of the 
definition will be discussed so that “major life activity” can be placed 
within the framework of “disability.” The determination of disability is 
made on an individualized basis.70 
1. Physical or Mental Impairment 
Impairment is the first element that must be met for an individual to 
be considered disabled.71 The ADA does not contain a list of 
impairments that would qualify.72 Therefore, courts have taken an 
individualized approach to determining whether something should be 
                                                                                                             
 63 Id. § 506(c)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(D). 
 64 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (citation omitted); see 
ADA §§ 1-3, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12102; see also id. § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) 
(defining disability). 
 65 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480. 
 66 Id. 
 67 ADA § 3, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102. 
 68 See infra Part II.B. 
 69 ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). 
 70 Id.; see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 657 (1997) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also infra notes 73, 124 
and accompanying text. 
 71 ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). 
 72 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 802. 
2005] “Interacting with Others” as a Major Life Activity 147 
considered an impairment under the ADA.73 This determination is guided 
by interpretive regulations issued by several federal agencies that have 
been assigned by Congress to administer and enforce the ADA.74 One 
such regulation issued by the EEOC provides that a physical impairment 
includes: 
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the 
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special 
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), 
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic 
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or 
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental 
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, 
and specific learning disabilities.75 
Conversely, the ADA specifically excludes certain conditions from 
the definition of disability. These conditions include the current use of 
illegal drugs,76 transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, 
voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical 
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, 
kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders 
resulting from current illegal use of drugs.77 With regard to an 
individual’s illegal drug use, that individual’s condition is not excluded 
from the definition of “disability” if he or she: 
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation 
program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or 
has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer 
engaging in such use; 
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is 
no longer engaging in such use; or 
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not 
engaging in such use . . . . 78 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. This makes sense considering that disability as a whole must be determined on 
an individualized basis. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 74 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 802. 
 75 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2005). 
 76 ADA §§ 104(a), 510(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12114(a), 12210(a). 
 77 Id. § 511(b)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211(b)(1)-(3). 
 78 Id. § 104(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(b). Current drug use is not a disability, but 
because past drug use can be a disability, it is critical to determine when the employee 
was using drugs. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 803. 
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However, it is not a violation of the ADA for an employer “to adopt or 
administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to 
drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in paragraph 
(1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.”79 
A condition need not be permanent in order to be covered by the 
ADA. “[A]lthough ‘temporary, non-chronic impairments of short 
duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not 
disabilities,’ an impairment does not have to be permanent to rise to the 
level of a statutory disability.”80 
Determining whether there is an impairment is the first step in 
determining whether an individual is “disabled.” The next step is to 
determine whether one of the individual’s major life activities is limited 
by the impairment. 
2. Major Life Activity 
As mentioned above, this article will focus on the meaning of 
“major life activity.” The ADA does not list what is included in the 
definition of major life activity. The EEOC has provided guidance by 
stating that major life activities include “functions such as caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working.”81 The Supreme Court has also added 
procreation to this list.82 Several circuits have added other activities to 
the list83 such as eating,84 sleeping,85 and sexual relations.86 One circuit 
has said that bowling, camping, restoring cars, and mowing the lawn are 
not major life activities.87 The EEOC has provided further guidance in 
the appendix to its regulations relating to the ADA, stating that “‘[m]ajor 
life activities’ are those basic activities that the average person in the 
                                                                                                             
 79 ADA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(b). 
 80 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 803 (quoting the EEOC Interpretive and 
Compliance Manuals); see also Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(adopting the EEOC’s position), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999). 
 81 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2005). 
 82 Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1997). 
 83 For a discussion on judicial responses to efforts to expand the list of major life 
activities, including (1) the physical activities of eating, sleeping, controlling bodily 
waste, running, exercise, and sports; physical agility and sexual relations; (2) the mental 
activities of concentration and thinking, awareness, and memory; (3) interpersonal 
activities; (4) the educational activities of education and test-taking; and reading; (5) 
transportation activities; and (6) miscellaneous activities, see Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes 
and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of “Major Life Activity” in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 321, 340-65 (2002). 
 84 Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 85 McAlindin v. San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. 221 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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general population can perform with little or no difficulty.”88 The 
appendix also noted that the list of examples listed in the actual 
regulation89 is not exhaustive and “other major life activities include, but 
are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching.”90 
The Supreme Court has provided some guidance on how to define 
“major.” In Bragdon v. Abbott,91 the Court considered whether the 
plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of 
reproduction because she was HIV positive.92 In determining that 
reproduction is a major life activity, the Court stated that “the plain 
meaning of the word ‘major’ denotes comparative importance and 
suggests that the touchstone for determining an activity’s inclusion under 
the statutory rubric is its significance.”93 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his 
concurrence in part and dissent in part, disagreed.94 He said that the 
majority ignored the “alternative definition of ‘major’ as ‘greater in 
quantity, number, or extent.’”95 This is the definition that he thought was 
most consistent with the ADA’s example list of major life activities.96 He 
based this conclusion on his observation that “the common thread” 
linking the activities listed in the EEOC regulation is that they “are 
repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a 
normally functioning individual.”97 Justice O’Connor, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist and stated: 
the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of 
the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the 
representative major life activities of all persons – “caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and working” – listed in 
regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990.98 
In Bragdon, the defendant claimed that Congress intended the ADA 
to cover only activities that had a “public, economic, or daily 
                                                                                                             
 88 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (2005). 
 89 See id.; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 90 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i). 
 91 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 92 Id. at 628. 
 93 Id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 107 F.3d 
934, 939-940 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
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character.”99 The Court, however, rejected this argument stating that 
“[n]othing in the definition suggests that activities without a public, 
economic, or daily dimension may somehow be regarded as so 
unimportant or insignificant as to fall outside the meaning of the word 
‘major.’”100 
Another case in which the Court commented on the meaning of 
“major” was Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.101 
In that case the Court characterized “major” by combining its definition 
from Bragdon with the definition that Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor advocated in their separate opinions in Bragdon.102 
Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the Court in Toyota.103 The Court 
stated that the term “‘[m]ajor’ in the phrase ‘major life activities’ means 
important.”104 “Major life activity,” thus, refers to those activities that are 
of central importance to daily life.”105 The Court further noted that “[i]f 
each of the tasks included in the major life activity [in question] does not 
independently qualify as a major life activity, then together they must do 
so.”106 
Determining what activities are “major” for purposes of “major life 
activity” is an important step in determining whether an individual is 
disabled under the ADA. The fact that there is not an absolute bright-line 
standard can be a benefit to plaintiffs because it allows them the 
opportunity to argue that a certain activity should be considered a major 
life activity. 
3. Substantial Limitation 
Once it is determined that there is a major life activity involved, the 
next step is to determine whether that major life activity is substantially 
limited. Like “major life activity,” the ADA does not define 
“substantially limits.”107 The EEOC has defined “substantially limits” to 
mean 
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person 
in the general population can perform; or 
                                                                                                             
 99 Id. at 638 (majority opinion). 
 100 Id. 
 101 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 102 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
 103 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187. 
 104 Id. at 197 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1363 (1976)). 
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 107 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). 
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(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which an individual can perform a particular 
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or 
duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform that same major life activity.108 
The EEOC provides a list of factors that should be considered in 
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life 
activity.109 This list includes “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment, 
. . . [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment, and . . . [t]he 
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term 
impact of or resulting from the impairment.”110 In the interpretive 
appendix to its regulations on the ADA, the EEOC provides that 
“temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no 
long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.”111 Examples 
of impairments that fall into this category “may include, but are not 
limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and 
influenza. Similarly, except in rare circumstances, obesity is not 
considered a disabling impairment.”112 
The EEOC regulations also specifically address the major life 
activity of working.113 With regard to working, substantially limits means 
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person 
having comparable training, skills and abilities.”114 However, “the 
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a 
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”115 There are 
also some separate factors to consider, in addition to the general factors 
listed above, when determining if the activity of working is substantially 
limited.116 These factors include: 
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable 
access; 
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified 
because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs 
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within 
                                                                                                             
 108 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2005). 
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that geographical area, from which the individual is also 
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or 
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified 
because of an impairment, and the number and types of other 
jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, 
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also 
disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in 
various classes).117 
The Supreme Court has provided some guidance on the issue of 
“substantial limitation.” It is not necessary that plaintiffs show that they 
cannot perform the major life activity at all, because the ADA “addresses 
substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”118 
Thus, when the impairment significantly limits the major life activity, the 
definition is satisfied, even if there is not a complete or total limitation.119 
However, plaintiffs must show that their activities are in fact 
substantially limited.120 The Court has stated that “‘substantially’ 
suggests ‘considerable’ or ‘specified to a large degree.’”121 Therefore, a 
“mere difference” in how that activity is performed does not amount to a 
“significant restriction.”122 The Court has also stated that “[t]he word 
‘substantial’ . . . clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a 
minor way with the performance of [a major life activity] from 
qualifying as disabilities.”123 When proving that the limitation is 
substantial, plaintiffs must prove that the degree of the limitation caused 
by their impairment is substantial in terms of their own personal 
experience.124 Thus, substantiality must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Much of the Court’s guidance in this area has been in the context of 
the major life activity of working.125 With regard to the major life 
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 118 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1997). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999). 
 121 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (citing WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1976)); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky, 
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002). 
 122 Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 565. 
 123 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197. 
 124 Id. at 198 (quoting Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567). 
 125 See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (rejecting myopia as a substantial limitation on 
the major life activity of working); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 
(1999) (rejecting high blood pressure as a substantial limitation on the major life activity 
of working); Albertson’s, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (rejecting monocular vision as a 
substantial limitation on the major life activity of working, but noting that a monocular 
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activity of working, the Court said that to show substantial limitation 
plaintiffs must allege that they are “unable to work in a broad class of 
jobs,”126 not just “one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of 
choice.”127 The Court further noted that if there are jobs available that 
utilize an individual’s skills, though not necessarily the individual’s 
unique talents, then the individual is not precluded from working in a 
broad class of jobs.128 
After the passage of the ADA, there was division among the circuit 
courts on whether an individual’s impairment should be considered in its 
natural state or as affected by mitigating or correcting factors, such as 
glasses or contacts, medication, or prosthetic devices, when determining 
if the condition substantially limits a major life activity.129 The Supreme 
Court resolved the issue in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.130 The Court 
stated that when it considered the ADA as a whole it was clear that “if a 
person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental 
impairment, the effects of those measures – both positive and negative – 
must be taken into account when judging whether that person is 
‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under 
the Act.”131 The ADA requires a present substantial limitation of a major 
life activity for a disability to exist, not a possible or hypothetical 
substantial limitation.132 The Court reasoned that if an individual corrects 
his or her condition, though he or she is still impaired, there is no 
impairment that presently substantially limits a major life activity.133 The 
Court also concluded that to evaluate persons in their uncorrected or 
unmitigated state is in direct opposition of the ADA’s mandate to do an 
individualized inquiry.134 In another case, decided on the same day as 
Sutton, the Court extended this rule to cover cases where the mitigation 
measures are undertaken, “whether consciously or not, within the body’s 
own systems.”135 
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seeing). 
 126 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. 
 127 Id. at 492. 
 128 Id. 
 129 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 806. 
 130 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 131 Id. at 482. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 482-83. 
 134 Id. at 483. 
 135 Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s subconscious ability to compensate for his visual impairment should be taken 
into consideration when determining whether he was substantially limited in a major life 
activity). 
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Even if a plaintiff establishes that his or her impairment affects a 
major life activity, the substantial limitation requirement can be a 
significant hurdle to overcome. However, once this final element is met, 
an individual will be considered “disabled” for purposes of the ADA. 
4. The “Record Of” and “Regarded As” Prongs of the “Disability” 
Definition 
As the definition of “disability” makes clear, the ADA applies to 
individuals for whom there is a record of the individual’s impairment and 
for individuals who are regarded as having an impairment.136 The 
inclusion of the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs of the definition of 
disability shows that Congress was aware that the perception of disability 
can lead to discrimination against individuals even if they are not 
currently disabled.137 
The EEOC has defined “record of such impairment” to mean “has a 
history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”138 
Courts have agreed that the requirement of a substantial limitation on a 
major life activity also applies to an individual bringing a claim based on 
having a record of impairment.139 
The EEOC has defined “regarded as having such impairment” to 
mean 
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not 
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered 
entity as constituting such limitation; 
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others 
toward such impairment; or 
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in . . . this section but is 
treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting 
impairment.140 
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The Supreme Court also has provided some guidance on the issue. The 
Court has stated that there are two ways in which individuals will fall 
within the scope of the “regarded as” definition of disability:141 first, if “a 
covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;” or, 
second, if “a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, 
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life 
activities.”142 An example of the first case would be if an employer 
mistakenly believes that a person is hearing impaired, when the person in 
fact is not, and the employer treats the person differently because of this 
mistaken belief. An example of the second case would be if an employer 
knows that a person has dyslexia and thinks that this substantially limits 
the person’s ability to do his or her job, when in fact it is not a substantial 
limitation, and the employer treats the person differently because of this 
belief. “In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain 
misperceptions about the individual – it must believe either that one has a 
substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a 
substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so 
limiting.”143 The Court summed up by stating that “[a]n employer runs 
afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment decision based on a 
physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as 
substantially limiting a major life activity.”144 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
To date, only three circuits have decided the issue of whether 
“interacting with others” is considered a “major life activity” under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.145 All other circuits that have been 
faced with the issue have declined to decide it one way or the other.146 
                                                                                                             
 141 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). 
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 145 See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
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The First Circuit has decided that “getting along with others” is not a 
major life activity under the ADA.147 The Ninth Circuit has decided that 
“interacting with others” is a major life activity under the ADA.148 The 
Second Circuit has held that “getting along with others” is not a major 
life activity, but that “interacting with others” is a major life activity.149 
A. The Not a Major Life Activity Approach 
As stated above, the First Circuit has found that “interacting with 
others” is not a major life activity.150 In Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, 
Inc.,151 Randall Soileau sued his former employer, Guilford of Maine 
(“Guilford”), for wrongful termination claiming he was discriminated 
against on the basis of his disability.152 Soileau worked for Guilford in 
various capacities from 1979 to 1994.153 In 1992, Soileau began working 
for a new supervisor, Matt Earnest, who thought that Soileau’s 
performance was not up to par and that he had a negative attitude.154 At 
Earnest’s instruction, Soileau surveyed his co-workers’ opinions of his 
performance.155 Earnest then asked him to draft a plan to deal with the 
weak areas identified in the survey, but Soileau refused to do this 
because he did not think that the survey showed any weak areas.156 
Soileau also refused to train a co-worker after Earnest instructed him to 
do so and a dispute arose between them.157 Earnest issued Soileau a 
“Final Written Warning/Suspension” on March 23, 1994, and Soileau 
was suspended for two days to evaluate his own performance and draft 
                                                                                                             
whether we treat interacting with others as a separate major life activity or a subset of the 
broader activities of learning or working, [plaintiff] has similarly failed to provide 
sufficient evidence that her major depressive disorder has substantially limited her ability 
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an improvement plan.158 Upon returning to work he began a four-week 
monitoring period.159 Soileau, stressed because of the warning, saw a 
psychologist, Dr. Dannel Starbird.160 Dr. Starbird had previously 
diagnosed Soileau with a chronic depressive disorder known as 
dysthymia, which is a disorder that is “characterized by intermittent 
bouts of depression.”161 Dr. Starbird determined that Soileau was 
suffering from one of these bouts of depression.162 Earnest 
accommodated Soileau’s condition by relieving him of his 
responsibilities that involved significant interaction with other people.163 
At the end of the four-week monitoring period Soileau had not shown 
any improvement in the problem areas, nor had he submitted his plan for 
improvement.164 He was thus terminated on April 22, 1994.165 
Soileau sued Guilford for discrimination.166 The district court 
granted summary judgment for Guilford, and Soileau appealed.167 The 
First Circuit affirmed, holding that Soileau did not meet the definition of 
disabled under the ADA.168 The court considered the three elements that 
must be met, which are “(1) that he had a ‘physical or mental 
impairment’ that (2) ‘substantially limits’ (3) ‘a major life activity.’”169 
The court conceded that Soileau met the first element because he was 
diagnosed with dysthymia, but stated that Soileau could not meet the 
second and third elements.170 
The court discussed whether the ability to get along with others is a 
major life activity.171 The court first noted that the EEOC regulations do 
not list this ability as an example of a major life activity.172 However, the 
court also noted in a footnote that the EEOC Compliance Manual does 
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list interacting with others as a major life activity,173 but dismissed the 
manual as “hardly binding.”174 
The court stated that the phrase “‘ability to get along with others’ is 
remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make it unworkable as a 
definition” and that “to impose legally enforceable duties on an employer 
based on such an amorphous concept would be problematic.”175 The 
court also noted that the ability to get along with others is different in 
kind from other major life activity examples used in the EEOC 
regulations, such as breathing or walking.176 The court left the door 
slightly open by stating that “a more narrowly defined concept going to 
essential attributes of human communication could, in a particular 
setting, be understood to be a major life activity . . . .”177 
The court concluded that, even assuming that “the ability to get 
along with others” is a major life activity, Soileau’s claim would fail 
because he did not provide any evidence of a substantial limitation.178 
This was because Soileau did not have trouble interacting with anyone 
but his supervisor.179 The court also said there was no substantial 
limitation because the limitations that Soileau’s condition imposed, such 
as wanting to leave bars and stores when they got crowded, were 
common among the population in general and were “not 
extraordinary.”180 The fact that he felt inclined to leave crowded places 
was not enough to show that his impairment was severe enough to be a 
substantial limitation.181 Soileau also failed to produce evidence that his 
condition would be long-term, and thus could not show that it was a 
substantial limitation.182 The court then affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment for Guilford.183 
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B. The Major Life Activity Approach 
Two circuits have decided that interacting with others is a major 
life activity: the Ninth Circuit, in McAlindin v. County of San Diego,184 
and the Second Circuit, in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.185 
In McAlindin, plaintiff Richard McAlindin sued the County of San 
Diego for discrimination in the way he was treated at work, which he 
alleged was on the basis of his disability.186 McAlindin began working as 
a systems analyst for the County’s Housing and Community 
Development Department in September 1983.187 He was diagnosed with 
anxiety disorders, panic disorders, and somatoform disorders,188 for 
which he received psychotherapy and medication.189 In 1989, McAlindin 
received a provisional promotion that required him to perform new and 
very stressful duties.190 As a result, McAlindin sought and was granted 
leave due to “work stress.”191 McAlindin again took leave for stress in 
1992.192 While he was on leave, he repeatedly requested that the County 
transfer him to a job that was less stressful as a “reasonable 
accommodation” required by the ADA.193 The County offered to put his 
name on a transfer list, but refused to give him special treatment to 
ensure a transfer.194 When he returned to work he felt that he was treated 
differently and was given a written warning for sleeping on the job.195 He 
also believed that he was treated differently when it came to training 
opportunities because he was not sent to off-site training like another 
systems analyst.196 
The district court granted summary judgment for the County on 
McAlindin’s disability claim, holding that he did not have a disability 
within the meaning of the ADA, and McAlindin appealed.197 The Ninth 
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Circuit reversed, holding that interacting with others is a “major life 
activity” and that there was a triable issue as to whether McAlindin was 
substantially limited in that major life activity.198 
The Ninth Circuit accepted the fact that McAlindin was impaired.199 
Next, the court addressed whether McAlindin asserted a major life 
activity.200 The court cited the EEOC regulations, stating that “major life 
activities include ‘functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, 
and working.’”201 The court reasoned that “[b]ecause interacting with 
others is an essential, regular function, like walking and breathing, it 
easily falls within the definition of ‘major life activity.’”202 
The court cited the First Circuit’s finding that the “ability to get 
along with others” was too vague to be a major life activity.203 The court 
responded by stating that it saw “nothing in the statutory text that makes 
vagueness the test for determining what is a major life activity.”204 
Additionally, the court stated that interaction with others is “no more 
vague than ‘caring for oneself,’ which has been widely recognized as a 
major life activity.”205 
The court also pointed out that recognizing interacting with others 
as a major life activity does not mean that a person will be considered to 
be substantially limited in that activity just because he or she is 
“cantankerous.”206 Merely having trouble getting along with co-workers 
is not enough to show that there is a substantial limitation.207 The court 
held that, to prove substantial limitation of the major life activity of 
interacting with others, a plaintiff must show that his or her “relations 
with others were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems, for 
example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or 
failure to communicate when necessary.”208 The court remanded for trial 
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on the issue, among others, of whether McAlindin was substantially 
limited in the major life activity of interacting with others.209 
The other circuit that has found that “interacting with others” is a 
major life activity is the Second Circuit. In Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.,210 
plaintiff Audrey Jacques sued her former employer, DiMarzio, alleging 
that she was fired because she was “regarded as” disabled.211 DiMarzio 
hired Jacques in 1989 to package and assemble guitar components in its 
factory.212 During her tenure she received average to above-average 
employee evaluations.213 Jacques had psychiatric problems since she was 
a teenager.214 She suffered “severe and major depressions” and was 
treated for these problems for over forty years.215 In 1992, she informed 
the plant manager, Michael Altilio, that she “was suffering from severe 
depression and a depression disorder” and that she was taking Prozac.216 
Altilio was “very understanding” of Jacques’ condition and was 
supportive of her taking a two-week leave of absence.217 Jacques’ 
supervisor, Betty Capotosto, was not as sympathetic and told Jacques 
that while she was on leave she should “get crayons and a coloring book 
and make pot holders.”218 Jacques was diagnosed with a chronic form of 
bi-polar disorder in 1993.219 Her psychiatrist stated that her condition 
“made her vulnerable in social interactions such that she would react in 
unpredictable ways.”220 He also recommended that she work in a 
“structured, well-defined environment . . . with her own semi-closed 
space such as a cubicle would provide.”221 Towards the end of 1996, 
Jacques’ working relationship with Altilio and Capotosto became 
strained and Altilio told Jacques that, because of her “ongoing conflicts 
with other workers,” he wanted her to work exclusively from her 
home.222 Before Altilio and Jacques could agree on the terms of an 
independent contractor arrangement, Altilio informed Jacques that one of 
her coworkers, Leandra Mangin, had filed a harassment complaint 
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against Jacques.223 Jacques admitted that she teased and ridiculed 
Mangin, but said that it was “girl-talk and not harassment.”224 About a 
week later, Altilio asked the owner of the company, Larry DiMarzio, 
about the possibility of Jacques working at home and DiMarzio rejected 
the idea.225 Instead, he instructed Altilio to terminate Jacques because of 
her “‘numerous conflicts with supervisors and . . . coworkers.’”226 Altilio 
informed Jacques of his conversation with DiMarzio and told her that she 
was terminated.227 After failing to get relief before the National Labor 
Relations Board and the New York State Division of Human Rights, 
Jacques sought and received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and 
brought suit under the ADA and state law.228 
The district court granted summary judgment for DiMarzio on 
Jacques’ discrimination claims relating to her ability to take care of 
herself or work as major life activities, but held there was a “triable issue 
of fact as to whether DiMarzio regarded Jacques as having ‘severe 
problems’ ‘on a regular basis’ in her ‘relations with others.’”229 The jury 
found for Jacques and awarded her damages.230 DiMarzio appealed and 
Jacques cross-appealed from the district court ruling that she did not 
make out a prima facie case for her first two claims.231 The Second 
Circuit reversed the jury verdict based on an error in the district court’s 
jury instructions, but affirmed the district court’s finding that Jacques did 
not make out a prima facie case for her first two claims.232 
The court first laid out the elements of a prima facie case under the 
ADA.233 These elements are: “(1) plaintiff’s employer is subject to the 
ADA; (2) plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) 
plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her 
job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff 
suffered [an] adverse employment action because of her disability.”234 
The court noted that DiMarzio conceded that it was a covered entity 
under the ADA before moving on to discuss whether Jacques was 
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“disabled.”235 The court observed that “[i]ndividuals with ‘a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual’ are disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA.”236 The court also noted that an individual could be considered 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA if there is a record of the 
disability or if the individual was mistakenly regarded as having an 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.237 
DiMarzio conceded that Jacques’ disorder was an impairment for 
purposes of the ADA.238 Therefore, the court only needed to consider the 
issues of “whether ‘interacting with others’ [was] a major life activity 
protected under the ADA and, if so, what showing is necessary for a 
plaintiff to be considered ‘substantially limited’ in ‘interacting with 
others.’”239 The court then discussed the prior circuit court decisions of 
Soileau and McAlindin.240 It declined to follow either approach.241 The 
court noted that “there is a difference between ‘get[ting] along with 
others’ (the life activity considered in Soileau) and ‘interacting with 
others’ (the life activity considered in McAlindin).”242 The court agreed 
with the First Circuit in Soileau that “‘get[ting] along with others’ is an 
unworkably subjective definition of a ‘major life activity’ under the 
ADA – in much the same way that ‘perceiving’ (as distinct from merely 
‘seeing’ or ‘hearing’) would be an unworkably subjective ‘major life 
activity.’”243 The court also agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s 
“characterization of ‘interacting with others’ as ‘an essential, regular 
function’ that ‘easily falls within the definition of major life activity.’”244 
The court reasoned that “interacting with others” more objectively 
describes a life activity than does “getting along with others,” which the 
court said implies “proficiency or success and worsens the problem of 
subjectivity . . . .”245 The court concluded that interacting with others is a 
major life activity under the ADA, but did not adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
test for determining when there is a substantial limitation because it “is 
unworkable, unbounded, and useless as guidance to employers, 
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employees, judges, and juries.”246 Instead the court held that a plaintiff is 
substantially limited in interacting with others when plaintiff’s “mental 
or physical impairment severely limits the fundamental ability to 
communicate with others.”247 The court then stated that this standard is 
met “when the impairment severely limits the plaintiff’s ability to 
connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people – at the 
most basic level of these activities.”248 Conversely, the court provided 
that the standard is not met when a plaintiff’s “ability to communicate 
with others is not substantially limited but whose communication is 
inappropriate, ineffective, or unsuccessful.”249 The court ultimately 
remanded the case because the district court erred in giving the jury 
instructions, which prejudiced DiMarzio.250 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The federal circuits are divided over whether to consider 
“interacting with others” as a major life activity under the ADA and on 
how to determine when that activity is substantially limited.251 The first 
step in the analysis will be to show that interacting with others is in fact a 
major life activity. To do this it is necessary to look at how the Supreme 
Court has defined the term “major” and how interacting with others fits 
in with that definition and with other established major life activities.252 
After it is shown that interacting with others is a major life activity, the 
second step is to determine what constitutes a substantial limitation on 
this major life activity. The Supreme Court has provided guidance on 
what is meant by “substantial” and the three circuit courts that have 
addressed whether interacting with others is a major life activity have 
used three separate tests to determine what constitutes a substantial 
limitation.253 Although it seems clear that interacting with others is a 
major life activity, it is a closer question to determine what constitutes a 
substantial limitation on that activity. 
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A. Interacting with Others as a Major Life Activity 
1. It Falls Within the Definition of “Major” 
Whether one uses the majority’s definition of “major” in 
Bragdon,254 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s definition in his separate opinion 
in Bragdon,255 or the majority’s definition in Toyota,256 interacting with 
others falls within the definition of “major.”257 Interacting with others is 
both an “important” and a “significant” activity.258 Human beings are 
social creatures by nature and it is important for every individual to be 
able to interact and communicate with others, not only for basic survival 
needs, but also for entertainment, work, and family purposes. The fact 
that all individuals must interact and communicate with others at some 
point, and those that cannot are considered handicapped (such as the 
mentally retarded), shows the significance of this activity. 
Because of the importance and significance of interacting with 
others, it is necessarily an activity that is of “central importance to daily 
life” and one that occurs often.259 There are very few people that do not 
interact with others on a daily basis, even if only on a minimal level. 
Therefore interacting with others would also satisfy Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s definition of “greater in quantity, number, or extent.”260 
In light of the foregoing, it is difficult to argue that interacting with 
others is not “major” within the meaning of “major life activity.” The 
fact that it is a major life activity is emphasized even more when it is 
compared to established major life activities, as will be discussed in the 
next section. 
2. Similarity to Other Major Life Activities 
Not only does interacting with others fit into the definition of 
major, but it is also similar to many activities that are considered to be 
major life activities. Like walking, breathing, and speaking, it is an 
“essential [and] regular function . . . .”261 “Interacting with others” can 
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also be defined as “communicating with others.” “Communicating with 
others” can in turn be defined in its simplest forms as “speaking” and 
“hearing,” which are certainly major life activities.262 Some courts have 
found that communication is a major life activity.263 In Soileau, the First 
Circuit also indicated that communication could be considered a major 
life activity, but did not definitively state that it is.264 It is difficult to see 
how communication is not a major life activity if speaking and hearing 
are. In this same vein, it is difficult to see how interacting with others is 
not a major life activity if communication is. 
Though interacting with others has been criticized as being too 
vague,265 it is “no more vague than ‘caring for oneself,’”266 which is 
recognized as a major life activity.267 Like caring for oneself, interacting 
with others encompasses many activities.268 Interacting with others 
includes everything from speaking and listening to expressing emotion 
and managing conflicts. Of course the fact that other major life activities 
fall within “interacting with others” is not determinative on the issue of 
whether it is a major life activity, but it tends to show that it is. 
The Second Circuit in Jacques characterized “interacting with 
others” as an “essentially mechanical” function.269 What the court was 
inferring is that, to interact with others, one does not have to be good at 
it.270 It does not matter if the person has a bad personality or is not liked 
by anyone; one only has to participate in the interaction to be “interacting 
with others.”271 This objectivity shows that “interacting with others” is 
similar to other major life activities, such as speaking or working, which 
tend to look at ability to participate in the activity not how well one 
participates. Of course for certain activities, such as seeing, how well one 
sees goes directly to one’s ability to take part in the activity of seeing. 
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This, however, is not the case with regard to interacting with others, as 
explained above. 
Additionally, though courts have dismissed it as only persuasive 
authority,272 the EEOC Compliance Manual lists “interacting with 
others” as a major life activity.273 The Compliance Manual notes that the 
list of major life activities is not limited to physical activities, rather 
mental and emotional processes can be major life activities as well.274 
3. Why the First, Ninth, and Second Circuits All Have the Right 
Idea 
Even though there is a split between the three circuits that have 
decided the issue of whether interacting with others is a major life 
activity, there is language from all three opinions that can be used to 
support the finding of a major life activity. Despite finding that 
interacting with others is not a major life activity, the First Circuit in 
Soileau did state that a “narrowly defined concept going to essential 
attributes of human communication could . . . be understood to be a 
major life activity.”275 This directly supports the argument in the 
previous section, that interacting with others is analogous to 
communicating with others, and is thus a major life activity. 
The First Circuit also focused on the language “ability to get along 
with others” instead of “interacting with others.”276 The First Circuit was 
correct in rejecting “ability to get along with others” as a major life 
activity. The Second Circuit in Jacques “agree[d] with the First Circuit’s 
observation that ‘getting along with others’ is an unworkably subjective 
definition of a ‘major life activity’ under the ADA – in much the same 
way that ‘perceiving’ (as distinct from merely ‘seeing’ or ‘hearing’) 
would be an unworkably subjective ‘major life activity.’”277 The Second 
Circuit then noted that “‘interacting with others’ . . . more objectively 
describes a life activity than does ‘getting along with others,’ which 
connotes proficiency or success and worsens the problem of subjectivity 
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. . . .”278 There is a distinct difference between simply interacting with 
others, whether one is good or bad at it (an “essentially mechanical” 
function),279 and getting along with others, which implies that one is 
liked by all and never has a conflict with anyone (an “evaluative 
concept”).280 It is clear that such an activity cannot be considered a major 
life activity. Therefore, both the First and Second Circuits are correct in 
rejecting “ability to get along with others” as a major life activity. 
It is possible that, if the issue is brought before the First Circuit in a 
more direct fashion, namely specifically claiming the major life activity 
of “interacting with others,” it would find that this is a major life activity. 
This can be surmised from the First Circuit’s statement that 
communication could be a major life activity, and the fact that the 
Second Circuit, which found interacting with others as a major life 
activity, agreed with the First Circuit’s rejection of the ability to get 
along with others as a major life activity. 
The main point on which the Second and Ninth Circuits agree is 
that interacting with others is a major life activity.281 The disagreement 
between these two circuits is over what constitutes a substantial 
limitation on this major life activity, which will be discussed in the next 
section.282 
All three circuits are on the right track. First, the First and Second 
Circuits rejected the “ability to get along with others” as a major life 
activity,283 which is the correct approach. Second, the Second and Ninth 
Circuits held that “interacting with others” is a major life activity,284 
which is also the correct approach. Lastly, the First Circuit recognized 
that communication could be a major life activity,285 which leaves the 
door open for recognizing interacting with others as a major life activity. 
B. The Correct Test for Substantial Limitation 
Now that it has been shown that interacting with others is a major 
life activity, the next essential step is to determine what constitutes a 
substantial limitation on that major life activity. Three different tests 
have been used by the three circuits – the First, Ninth, and Second – that 
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have addressed whether interacting with others is a major life activity.286 
The Second Circuit’s test is the most workable and better test of the 
three. This is because it addresses the core aspect of interacting with 
others – one’s ability to communicate with others.287 
1. Possibilities 
There are two possible models for the test to determine when the 
major life activity of interacting with others is substantially limited. 
These two possibilities are the two tests that have actually been applied 
to the recognized major life activity of interacting with others.288 Other 
circuit courts have addressed the issue of what will be considered a 
substantial limitation on the major life activity of interacting with others 
by assuming, without deciding, that it is one. However, these other courts 
have merely cited the test set out by the Ninth Circuit in McAlindin,289 
except for the First Circuit, which used its own approach in deciding 
Soileau prior to McAlindin.290 
a. The First Circuit’s Test: Soileau 
In determining whether the plaintiff was substantially limited in the 
major life activity of interacting with others, the First Circuit used the 
EEOC definition of “substantial limitation,” which is essentially whether 
the average person in the general population would be significantly 
limited in performing the task.291 The First Circuit also considered the 
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factors suggested by the EEOC regulations,292 which include “the nature 
and severity” of the impairment,293 the “duration” of the impairment,294 
and the “long-term impact” of the impairment.295 
b. The Ninth Circuit’s Test: McAlindin 
The Ninth Circuit also used EEOC guidance as the basis for its 
approach for determining whether the major life activity of interacting 
with others is substantially limited. The court first noted that 
“[r]ecognizing interacting with others as a major life activity of course 
does not mean that any cantankerous person will be deemed substantially 
limited in a major life activity.”296 The court then provided that “[m]ere 
trouble getting along with coworkers is not sufficient to show a 
substantial limitation.”297 Using the EEOC regulations, the court 
recognized that “the limitation must be severe,” meaning that it must be 
substantial when “compared to the ability of ‘the average person in the 
general population.’”298 The court also used EEOC guidance in stating its 
holding: “We hold that a plaintiff must show that his ‘relations with 
others were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems, for 
example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or 
failure to communicate when necessary.’”299 
c. The Second Circuit’s Test: Jacques 
The Second Circuit spent much of its analysis of the substantial 
limitation issue explaining why the Ninth Circuit’s approach in 
McAlindin was incorrect.300 The court then stated its holding: “We hold 
that a plaintiff is ‘substantially limited’ in ‘interacting with others’ when 
the mental or physical impairment severely limits the fundamental ability 
to communicate with others.”301 The court elaborated by stating when the 
test is satisfied and when it is not.302 There is a substantial limitation 
“when the impairment severely limits the plaintiff’s ability to connect 
with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to 
them, or to go among other people – at the most basic level of these 
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activities.”303 There is not a substantial limitation when “a plaintiff 
whose basic ability to communicate with others is not substantially 
limited but whose communication is inappropriate, ineffective, or 
unsuccessful.”304 
2. Why the Second Circuit Is Correct 
The First Circuit’s approach is too generalized. The test is not 
specific and, like the EEOC regulations from which it is derived, can be 
interpreted broadly. Some commentators criticized this approach by 
saying that, even if interacting with others is recognized as a major life 
activity, satisfying the standard for a substantial limitation is so difficult 
that it is almost insurmountable.305 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is “unworkable, unbounded, and 
useless as guidance” for making the determination of whether the major 
life activity of interacting with others is substantially limited.306 
Requiring a showing of “severe problems”307 and “consistently high 
levels of hostility”308 misplaces the inquiry.309 Such requirements seem 
akin to determining whether an individual gets along with others instead 
of whether they can interact with others, as discussed above. 
Argumentativeness and hostility are desirable characteristics in many 
employment contexts,310 the practice of law being one of them. 
Furthermore, requiring consistently high levels of hostility encourages a 
“cantankerous” person to become even more difficult and bad 
tempered.311 An employer that has an employee who is extremely crass 
and harasses other employees would have to decide to either risk being 
sued by the employee for being fired or risk being sued by others who 
experience the hostile work environment that the employee’s behavior 
creates.312 “Social withdrawal”313 and “failure to communicate when 
necessary”314 seem to be more appropriate showings to require. 
However, “social withdrawal” has many different meanings, and not all 
of these meanings would be a substantial limitation on the ability to 
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interact with others.315 Some individuals prefer solitude and choose to 
spend time alone, but this does not make them substantially limited in 
interacting with others.316 “Failure to communicate when necessary” 
appears to be the only appropriate requirement of the Ninth Circuit’s test. 
As with the Second Circuit’s test, this element goes to the core of 
“interacting with others.” 
The Second Circuit’s test is the best approach because, as 
mentioned previously, it goes to the core of “interacting with others,” 
which is the ability to communicate with others. The requirement of 
showing a limitation on the “fundamental ability to communicate”317 gets 
directly at the essence of interacting with others. The court’s elaboration 
on what does and does not satisfy the standard performs two functions. 
First, it makes the test even clearer and easier to apply by further 
defining communication as the basic ability to “initiate contact with other 
people and respond to them.”318 Second, it shows what is included in the 
activity of interacting with others besides the core concept of 
communication with others, i.e. the ability to “go among other 
people.”319 This test also sets the clear standard that “inappropriate, 
ineffective, or unsuccessful” communication is not enough to satisfy the 
test for a substantial limitation.320 In sum, the Second Circuit test in 
Jacques is the best approach to take because it identifies communication 
as the core concept of interacting with others, but also recognizes that 
interacting with others encompasses more than communication, such as 
relating with and being among other people. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The federal circuit courts are divided over whether interacting with 
others is a major life activity. Currently, one circuit, the First Circuit, 
holds that it is not a major life activity, and two circuits, the Second and 
Ninth Circuits, hold that it is a major life activity.321 This article argues 
that the Ninth and Second Circuits are correct in finding that “interacting 
with others” is a major life activity. Interacting with others falls within 
the definition of “major,” as defined by the Supreme Court, because it is 
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a significant activity that has “central importance in daily life.”322 It is 
also similar to other major life activities.323 
This article also argues that the correct test to determine when the 
activity of interacting with others is substantially limited is when the 
fundamental ability to communicate with others – initiating contact with 
others, responding to them, and going among them – is severely 
limited.324 This is the correct test because it recognizes the two central 
aspects of interacting with others: communicating with people and being 
among them.325 
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